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A CHARACTERIZATION OF SEQUENTIAL RATIONALIZABILITY
JOSE APESTEGUIAy AND MIGUEL A. BALLESTERz
Abstract. A choice function is sequentially rationalizable if there is an ordered
collection of asymmetric binary relations that identies the selected alternative in
every choice problem. We propose a property, F-consistency, and show that it
characterizes the notion of sequential rationalizability. F-consistency is a testable
property that highlights the behavioral aspects implicit in sequentially rationaliz-
able choice. Further, our characterization result provides a novel tool with which
to study how other behavioral concepts are related to sequential rationalizability,
and establish a priori unexpected implications. In particular, we show that the
concept of rationalizability by game trees, which, in principle, had little to do with
sequential rationalizability, is a renement of the latter. Every choice function that
is rationalizable by a game tree is also sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show
that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable.
Keywords: Individual rationality, Rationalizability, Consistency, Bounded ratio-
nality, Behavioral economics, Voting.
JEL classication numbers: B41, D01.
1. Introduction
The classic choice model in economics encompasses choice behaviors that are the
result of maximizing a preference relation. When this is the case, any such choice
behavior is typically said to be rationalizable. Over the last decades, however, the
research has produced increasing amounts of evidence documenting systematic and
predictable deviations from the notion of rationality implied in the above denition.
Not surprisingly, these inconsistencies between theoretical models and applications
have allowed a number of alternative rationalizability models to ourish in the litera-
ture. In general, these models adopt less strict notions of rationality. Some recent
examples are:
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 Rationalization by multiple rationales (Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler, 2002):1
the decision-maker (DM) partitions the set of choice problems into dierent
categories and applies dierent rationales to dierent categories.
 Rationalizability by game trees (Xu and Zhou, 2007): the choices of the DM
are the equilibrium outcome of an extensive game with perfect information.
 Sequential Rationalizability (Manzini and Mariotti, 2007): the DM sequen-
tially applies a collection of rationales in a xed order.
It is the last of these approaches that concerns us here. The intuition of Manzini and
Mariotti's notion of sequential rationalizability is very appealing from a behavioral
perspective. It considers DMs that, when faced with a choice problem, apply a
number of criteria in a xed order of priority, gradually narrowing down the set
of alternatives until one is identied as the choice. Notably, Manzini and Mariotti
provide characterizations for those choice functions that are sequentially rationalizable
by two rationales, named Rational Shortlist Methods (RSMs), and three rationales.2
That is, the work of Manzini and Mariotti allows us to identify choice behavior that
can be sequentially rationalized by either two or by three rationales.
The question then arises of how to identify choice behavior that may be sequentially
rationalizable, but only by means of more than three rationales. In this paper we
propose a testable property of choice functions, F-consistency, that turns out to
be equivalent to the fact that a choice function c is sequentially rationalizable. F-
consistency has a behavioral avor and falls within the tradition of the properties that
can be found in the choice-theoretic literature. F-consistency suggests a particular
behavioral procedure that DMs may follow. It evokes the existence of a two-stage
procedure in which the DM rst makes a preselection of alternatives following a rule
requiring a great deal of behavioral consistency, and then makes the nal choice.
Our characterization allows a better understanding of sequential rationalizability.
Further, we show that this result opens up the possibility of linking sequential ra-
tionalizability with other rationalizability notions, and determining whether certain
choice patterns are sequentially rationalizable. In particular, we rst show that the
notion of rationalizability by game trees, due to Xu and Zhou (2007), which, in princi-
ple, had little to do with sequential rationalizability, is a strict renement of the latter.
Our property can be used to show that every choice function that is rationalizable by
game trees is in fact sequentially rationalizable, and a simple example shows that the
reverse does not hold. We then show that agenda rationalizability, a rationalizabi-
lity notion that we introduce here and that is rooted in certain models of choice by
ordered elimination and also in voting mechanisms based on successive elimination,
1For the moment take a rationale as a preference relation. We will be more precise later.
2Salant and Rubinstein (2008) provide an alternative characterization of RSMs in the framework
of a `limited attention' model.3
is also sequentially rationalizable. The proofs of these two links with sequential ra-
tionalizability constitute one of the direct implications of our characterization result.
Further, these two links suggest that the notion of sequential rationalizability may be
of interest in more environments than initially expected.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation and the main
denitions to be used thereafter. Section 3 contains the main result of the paper: the
characterization result. Section 4 presents two applications of sequential rationali-
zability: (i) rationalizability by game trees and (ii) agenda rationalizability. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2. Basic Notation and Definitions
Let X be a nite set of n  2 objects.3 We denote by P(X) the set of all non-
empty subsets of X. A choice function c on P(X) assigns to every A 2 P(X) a
unique element c(A) 2 A.
Denote by P an asymmetric binary relation on X, P  X X. That is, if xPy for
some x;y in X, then it is not true that yPx. We will often refer to P as a rationale.
For any A 2 P(X), M(A;P) denotes the set of maximal elements in A with respect
to P, that is M(A;P) = fx 2 A : yPx for no y 2 Ag. We will often write M(A) to
refer to M(A;P).
The classic notion of rationalizability of a choice function c deals with the issue
of existence of a binary relation P that explains choice behavior as the result of
maximization. That is, a choice function c is rationalizable if there is a binary relation
P such that, for any choice problem A 2 P(X), c(A) = M(A).4 A well-known result
establishes that a choice function c is rationalizable if and only if c satises the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property.5
Here we are interested in Manzini and Mariotti's sequential notion of rationaliza-
bility. A choice function c is sequentially rationalizable by the ordered collection of
rationales fP1;:::;PKg if, for every choice problem A, the sequential application of
the rationales in that xed order identies the selection of c. It is important to stress
that the order of application of rationales is xed across choice problems. In order to
introduce the formal denition of sequential rationalizability, given an ordered collec-
tion of rationales fP1;:::;PKg, let M0(A) = A and dene recursively for j = 1;:::;K,
3Manzini and Mariotti consider not necessarily nite sets of objects. In order to avoid tedious
technical details that add little to the understanding of sequential rationalizability, we chose to focus
on the nite case. Details of suitable extensions to the general case can be provided upon request.
Also, in relation to the next section, the setting of Xu and Zhou (2007) is nite.
4With a slight abuse of notation, we identify elements with sets containing only one element.
5IIA simply states that, if an alternative is chosen from a set, then it should also be chosen in
every subset of the set that contains the alternative.4
Mj(A) = M(Mj 1(A);Pj) = fx 2 Mj 1(A) : yPjx for no y 2 Mj 1(A)g.
Sequential Rationalizability: A choice function c is sequentially rationalizable
whenever there exists a non-empty ordered list fP1;:::;PKg of asymmetric binary
relations such that c(A) = MK(A) for all A 2 P(X):
In a sequential rationalization of a choice function, successive application of the
rationales eventually reduces the set of alternatives to a unique element, which is
precisely the choice according to c.
3. A Characterization of Sequential Rationalizability
In this section we introduce a new property of choice functions and show that it is
equivalent to the notion of sequential rationalizability. To this end, we rst need to
introduce some denitions. We say that a collection of choice problems F  P(X) is
a lter if: (i) for every set A in F, every non-empty subset of A also belongs to the
collection F, and (ii) there exists at least one problem set C 2 F with jCj  2. Note
that the collection of all choice problems P(X) is a lter.
We now introduce a choice correspondence, G dened on an arbitrary domain des-
cribed by a collection of problem sets G  P(X), that assigns to every A 2 G a
non-empty set of elements G(A)  A. We say that the choice correspondence G is
non-trivial if it is not true that G(A) = A for every A 2 G. G satises the  property
(or simply ), if, for any A;B 2 G, if x 2 A  B and x 2 G(B); then x 2 G(A).6
G satises Always Chosen (AC) if for any S 2 G, if fx;yg 2 G and x 2 G(fx;yg)
for all y 2 S n fxg, then x 2 G(S). We are now in a position to introduce the key
behavioral property of choice behavior.
F-Consistency: A choice function c satises F-consistency if, for every lter
F  P(X), there exists a choice correspondence F such that F is non-trivial, sat-
ises , AC, and c(A) = c(F(A)) for every A 2 F.
F-consistency suggests a two-stage procedure. In the rst-stage, the correspon-
dence F makes a `rational' preselection of alternatives, and then, in the second-stage,
the nal choice takes place. We speak of a `rational' preselection of alternatives be-
cause F-consistency imposes a great deal of structure on the choice correspondences
F. F-consistency imposes  and substitutes the classical property  for AC.7 This
means that we allow for some, but not all, violations of property . For example,
consider a choice correspondence F over F = fA = fx;yg;B = fx;y;zg;C = fy;zgg
6This property is also known as the Cherno Axiom. In the context of choice functions, the
parallel property is also known as Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, as already mentioned.
7Property : Let A;B 2 F with A  B, if x;y 2 F(A) and x 2 F(B), then y 2 F(B).5
such that A = F(A) and x 2 F(B). Notice that, whenever y 2 F(C), then AC
implies that y 2 F(B). Hence property  follows for sets A and B. But if in the
previous example y 62 F(C), then AC has no bite, and hence property  could be
violated.
It is remarkable how the imposition of these two-stage behavioral procedures on
every possible lter is sucient to characterize any sequentially rationalizable choice,
even when the latter requires more than two rationales to be sequentially rationalized.
We can now present the main result of this paper:
Theorem 3.1. Given a choice function c, the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) c is sequentially rationalizable.
(2) c satises F-consistency.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: 1 ) 2. Suppose that c is sequentially rationalizable by
an ordered collection of asymmetric binary relations fP1;:::;PKg. We have to show
that, for every lter F, there is a non-trivial choice correspondence F that satises
, AC, and is such that c(A) = c(F(A)) for every A 2 F.
Let F be a lter. Consider  = minfj 2 f1;2;:::;Kg such that aPjb for some fa;bg
2 Fg, and dene for every A 2 F, F(A) = M(A). That is, P is the very rst ratio-
nale in fP1;:::;PKg that applies in F. By construction, it is not dicult to see that
for every A 2 F, F(A) = M(A) = M(M 1(A);P) = M(A;P). We now show
that it satises the requirements of F-consistency.
 Clearly, by denition of , F is a non-trivial choice correspondence on F.
 To show that F satises , let A  B with A;B 2 F. Let x 2 A \ F(B).
Then, for every y 2 B n fxg it cannot be true that yPx, and therefore,
in particular for every y 2 A n fxg, it cannot be true that yPx. Hence,
x 2 M(A) = F(A), as desired.
 To show that F satises AC, let x 2 F(fx;yg) for all y 2 S n fxg with
S 2 F. Then, for every y 2 S nfxg, it cannot be true that yPx, and trivially
it must be the case that x 2 F(S), as desired.
 Finally, we have to show that c(A) = c(F(A)) for every A 2 F. To this
end note that, since we are assuming that c is sequentially rationalizable by
fP1;:::;PKg, it must be that c(A) = MK(A) for every choice problem A. By
denition we have
c(A) = MK(A) = MK(MK 1(A))
= 
= MK(MK 1(M+1(M(A)))):6





and hence the claim follows.
We have shown that F satises the requirements and, therefore, c satises F-
consistency.
2 ) 1. Assume that c satises F-consistency. We rst claim the existence of: (i)
collections of sets fFjgj2N which are either lters containing all singletons or simply
the set of all singletons, (ii) choice correspondences fFjgj2N over these collections of
sets satisfying the properties given by F-consistency and, (iii) rationales fPjgj2N.8
Take F1 = P(X). It is immediate that F1 is a lter containing all singletons. By
F-consistency there is a non-trivial choice correspondence F1 that satises , AC
and c(A) = c(F1(A)) for every A 2 F1. Finally dene P1 by aP1b , [a 6= b;a =
F1(fa;bg)]: It is immediate that P1 is asymmetric.
We now prove the inductive step. Suppose that (i) fFjg
t 1
j=1 is a collection of
(collections of) sets which are either lters containing all singletons or the set of
all singletons, (ii) fFjg
t 1
j=1 is a collection of choice correspondences dened on the
corresponding collections of sets, that satisfy the properties given by F-consistency,
and (iii) fPjg
t 1
j=1 is a list of rationales. First, dene Ft as Ft = fA : there exists B 2
Ft 1 such that A = Ft 1(B)g: We check that it is either a lter containing all the
singletons or the collection of all singletons. Let B 2 Ft and A  B. By denition
there is a set D 2 Ft 1 such that B = Ft 1(D). Hence, it must be that A  B  D.
Then, since Ft 1 is either a lter containing all singletons or the collection of all
singletons, it must be that A 2 Ft 1. Since A  D, by , Ft 1(A)  A \ Ft 1(D).
But then, A\Ft 1(D) = A\B = A, which implies that A = Ft 1(A), and therefore
A 2 Ft, as desired. Hence, if Ft contains a set S with jSj  2, then Ft is a lter. Given
that Ft 1 contains all singletons and Ft 1 is a choice correspondence, the image of
each singleton by that correspondence is the singleton itself, and hence all singletons
are also in Ft too. This implies that Ft is either a lter containing all singletons or
the collection of all singletons.
By F-consistency, if Ft is a lter, there is a non-trivial choice correspondence Ft
that satises , AC, and c(A) = c(Ft(A)) for every A 2 Ft. If Ft is the collection
of all singletons, dene Ft as the unique correspondence on Ft, i.e., the identity
mapping. Finally dene Pt by aPtb , [a 6= b;a = Ft(fa;bg)]: It is immediate that
Pt is asymmetric, and we have concluded the inductive step.
8As usual, N denotes the set of strictly positive integers.7
We now show that for all A 2 P(X) and for all j 2 N, it is the case that Mj(A) =
Fj  Fj 1    F1(A).9 Consider a set A 2 P(X). We start by proving that
M1(A) = F1(A). Let x 2 F1(A). By , we know that x 2 F1(fx;yg) for every
y 2 A n fxg and hence, by the denition of P1, for every y 2 A n fxg, it is not true
that yP1x. This shows that, if x 2 F1(A), then x 2 M1(A). Now let x 2 M1(A). By
denition, for every y 2 Anfxg, it is not true that yP1x and hence it must be that for
every y 2 A n fxg, x 2 F1(fx;yg). AC guarantees that x 2 F1(
S
y2Anfxgfx;yg) =
F1(A), as desired. Consequently, if x 2 M1(A) then x 2 F1(A). We have shown
that M1(A) = F1(A).
We now prove the inductive step. Suppose that Mj(A) = Fj  Fj 1    F1(A)
for all j < t. We now show that Mt(A) = Ft  Ft 1    F1(A). Let it be that
x 2 Ft  Ft 1    F1(A). By , x 2 Ft(fx;yg) for every y 2 Ft 1  Ft 2 
  F1(A) n fxg. Hence, yPtx for no y 2 Ft 1  Ft 2    F1(A) n fxg and
then, since obviously x 2 Ft 1  Ft 2    F1(A) = Mt 1(A) we conclude that
x 2 Mt(A), as desired. In the other direction, let x 2 Mt(A). This implies that
yPtx for no y 2 Mt 1(A) = Ft 1  Ft 2    F1(A), and hence by denition
x 2 Ft(fx;yg) for every y 2 Ft 1  Ft 2    F1(A) n fxg. AC implies that
x 2 Ft(
S
y2Ft 1Ft 2F1(A)nfxgfx;yg) = Ft  Ft 1    F1(A), as desired.
Therefore, Mt(A) = Ft  Ft 1    F1(A).
We now show that there must exist a value K 2 N such that Fj is a lter if and
only if j  K. Given the construction, it is obvious that Fj+1  Fj for all j 2 N.
Therefore, we are left to prove that the collection Fj+1 is a strict subset of Fj for
j = 1;:::K, and that FK+1 is the collection of singletons. The latter derives from
the former given the niteness assumption. To show that Fj+1  Fj for all j  K,
note that whenever Fj is not the collection of all singletons, then it is a lter, and Fj
satises non-triviality. Therefore, there exists a set A 2 Fj such that Fj(A) 6= A.
Take y 2 A with y 62 Fj(A). We claim that A 62 Fj+1. By contradiction, suppose
A 2 Fj+1. Then y 2 A = Fj(B) for some B 2 Fj. But the application of 
guarantees that y 2 Fj(A), which is a contradiction. Therefore, lters contract
strictly and there must exist a value K 2 N such that Fj is a lter if and only if
j  K.
We nish by proving that fPjgK
j=1 rationalizes c. Given the construction, FK 
FK 1    F1(A) is a singleton, and then we have that MK(A) = FK  FK 1 
  F1(A) = c(FK  FK 1    F1(A)). Now, since all correspondences satisfy
the requirements of F-consistency c(FK  FK 1    F1(A)) = c(FK 1  FK 2 
  F1(A)) =  = c(F1(A)) = c(A). This shows that the choice is sequentially
rationalized.
9Where  denotes the composition operator of two functions.8
Theorem 3.1 shows that, to determine whether a particular choice procedure is
sequentially rationalizable, one needs to check for F-consistency. Further, Theorem
3.1 also shows that since F-consistency imply a high degree of behavioral structure,
the notion of sequential rationalizability is a tight one.
4. Applications
Our characterization result allows to identify what is and what is not sequentially
rationalizable. This, in turn, opens up the possibility of judging whether choice mod-
els that may have little to do, in principle, with sequential rationalizability, are in fact
connected to the notion of sequential rationalizability. In this section, we illustrate
these new possibilities by rst establishing a perhaps unexpected relation between
sequential rationalizability and another important recent notion of rationalizability:
rationalizability by game trees. We then show that agenda rationalizability, a notion
that is rooted in individual and social procedures of selection through the ordered
elimination of alternatives, is also sequentially rationalizable.
It is convenient to mention, in advance, the connection between sequential rationa-
lizability and two polar notions of rationalizability. On the one hand, it is immediate
that every standard rationalizable function10 is sequentially rationalizable, while the
reverse does not hold. On the other hand, every choice function, and thus every
sequentially rationalizable choice function, is rationalizable by multiple rationales  a
la Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler (2002), but, again, the converse does not hold.
4.1. Rationalizability by Game Trees. In this section we show that any choice
function that is rationalizable by game trees is in fact sequentially rationalizable. As
the converse does not hold, the set of choice functions rationalizable by a game tree
is a strict subset of the set of choice functions satisfying sequential rationalizability.
Xu and Zhou characterize those choice functions that can be rationalized by ex-
tensive games with perfect information. For a choice function c to be rationalizable
by game trees, there must be a tree G that: (i) has alternatives X as terminal nodes,
such that each alternative in X appears once and only once as a terminal node of G
(hence, X and G can be identied), and (ii) every node in the tree G must represent
a decision by an agent i, with a linear ordering Ri over X.
Rationalizability by Game Trees: A choice function c is rationalizable by game
trees whenever there exists a game tree G such that
c(A) = SPNE(GjA;R) for all A 2 P(X);
where GjA is the reduced tree of G that retains all the branches of G leading to ter-
minal nodes in A, R is the linear order prole, and SPNE( ) stands for the subgame
10That is, every choice function that satises IIA.9
perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of  .
Denote by CSR and CRGT the sets of choice functions that are, respectively, se-
quentially rationalizable and rationalizable by game trees. We can now present the
following result.
Theorem 4.1. CRGT  CSR.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: We show that CRGT  CSR by way of F-consistency. We
rst need the following denitions. Given a lter F a node i is relevant for F if there
is a set A in F, with jAj  2, such that for all x 2 A, x is a successor of i. We say
that i is minimally relevant if it is relevant and no successor of i is relevant. That is,
i is minimally relevant whenever i decides the nal choice among a set A in F.
Given a lter F select a node i that is is minimally relevant. Then, there is a set
A in F, with jAj  2, where i makes the nal choice. Pick the worst alternative in




A if x 62 A or y 62 A
A n fyg if x;y 2 A
It is immediate that F is non-trivial, satises AC, and . We have to show that
c(A) = c(F(A)) for every A in F. Given the denition of F(A) we only need
to show the latter equality for cases in which x and y are elements of A. But,
since, by assumption, c(A) = SPNE(GjA;R) and i is a terminal decision in which
y is dominated, backward induction guarantees that c(A) = SPNE(GjA;R) =
SPNE(Gj(A n fyg);R) = c(A n fyg) = c(F(A)). Therefore, F-consistency holds,
and then Theorem 3.1 guarantees that CRGT  CSR.
We show, by way of an example, that CSR 6 CRGT: Let c(x1;x2;y1) = y1;c(x1;x2;y2) =
x2;c(x1;y1;y2) = x1;c(x2;y1;y2) = y1;c(x1;x2;y1;y2) = y1;c(x1;x2) = x2;c(x1;y1) =
x1;c(x1;y2) = y2;c(x2;y1) = y1;c(x2;y2) = x2; and c(y1;y2) = y1.
To see that c 62 CRGT, we show that c does not satisfy the property divergence
consistency, which Xu and Zhou show to be a necessary condition for rationalizability
by game trees. First, consider the following denitions. For any triple x;y;z, x
diverges before y and z, if c(fx;yg) = x;c(fy;zg) = y; and c(fz;xg) = z (or a
similar condition holds for some permutation of x;y; and z), and c(fx;y;zg) = x.
Finally, divergence consistency states that, for any four alternatives x1, x2, y1, y2, if
x1 diverges before y1 and y2, and y1 diverges before x1 and x2, then c(fx1;y1g) = x1
if and only if c(fx2;y2g) = y2.
It can be easily seen that, in our example, x1 diverges before y1 and y2, and y1
diverges before x1 and x2. At the same time, we have c(x1;y1) = x1 but c(x2;y2) =10
x2, contradicting divergence consistency. However, the choice function is sequen-
tially rationalizable by the rationales: P1 = f(y1;y2)g, P2 = f(x2;x1)g and P3 =
f(x1;y1);(y2;x1);(y1;x2);(x2;y2)g. This ends the proof of the theorem.
The above proof puts in action our property, F-consistency, to show that a choice
function that is rationalizable by game trees is also sequentially rationalizable.
4.2. Agenda Rationalizability. We now introduce a rationalizability notion that
is rooted in (i) a particular choice procedure that is attracting some attention in the
economics and psychology literature, and (ii) in a class of voting mechanisms. Let us
rst introduce the details and then draw the connections with the above two strands
of literature.
Let us assume that the n elements in X are linearly ordered 1 < 2 <  < n. This
order may be interpreted as, say, a particular physical presentation of the objects.
For any choice problem A in X, write the elements in A ordered according to <
by a(1) < a(2) <  < a(t). The DM makes a selection from A according to
the following elimination process. First she makes a rst selection between a(1)
and a(2), then compares the selected element from a(1);a(2) with a(3) and makes a
new selection. The DM continues in this ordered way until the surviving element is
compared with the last element a(t); this last choice determines the choice in A. Let
that whenever two alternatives x;y are compared, the selection between x and y is
the same, irrespective of the set A to which x and y belong.
Similar choice by ordered elimination procedures are studied in the choice-theoretic
literature. The models studied in Rubinstein and Salant (2006) and Salant and Ru-
binstein (2008), for example, include this one as a special case. See also Masatlioglu
and Nakajima (2007). But the binary choices between alternatives may also be the
result of majority voting, for example. Then voting mechanisms like voting by succes-
sive elimination are also connected to the above (see Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton,
2002).
We can now introduce the following notion of rationalizability.
Agenda Rationalizability: A choice function c is agenda rationalizable whenever
there exists an order < over the set of alternatives (an agenda) and binary choices
such that for every A 2 P(X), c is the outcome of the elimination process.
McGarvey (1953) strengthens the connection between agenda rationalizability and
voting. McGarvey (1953) already showed that, for every possible connected asymme-
tric relation over the set of alternatives, there is a set of individuals with linear
orders over the set of alternatives such that majority voting over pairs of alternatives
determine the connected asymmetric relation.11
Here we wonder about the relation between agenda rationalizability and sequential
rationalizability. Denote by CAR the set of choice functions that are agenda rational-
izable. We can now present the following result.
Theorem 4.2. CAR  CSR.
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Theorem 3.1 tells us that we simply have to check whether
F-consistency holds. But this is straightforward. For any lter F let x be the rst
alternative according to < such that there is another alternative z 2 X n fxg with
fx;zg in F. Now, given x, select the pair fx;yg in F such that there is no z with
z < y and fx;zg in F. That is, fx;yg is lexicographically the rst pair in F accord-




A if x 62 A or y 62 A
A n fyg if x;y 2 A
It is immediate that F is non-trivial, satises AC, , and that c(A) = c(F(A)) for
every A in F. Hence, F-consistency holds and Theorem 3.1 implies that CAR  CSR.
The example in the proof of Theorem 4.1 can be used to show that in fact CAR 6=
CSR.11
Like in the case of rationalizability by game trees, we have used F-consistency to
establish the relation between agenda and sequential rationalizability. This simple
proof illustrates the usefulness of F-consistency.
5. Final Remarks
In this paper we have studied the structure of sequential rationalizability. In
essence, we contribute to the literature in two dierent ways. First, we clarify the
behavioral structure of sequential rationalizability. We do so by oering a characteri-
zation result, in which we prove that a testable property, F-consistency, is equivalent
to the notion of sequential rationalizability.
Second, we show that our characterization result is useful in the sense that it faci-
litates investigation of the relationships between dierent notions of rationalizability,
and it allows verication of whether particular choice procedures are sequentially
rationalizable. We have shown that the notions of rationalizability by game trees
and agenda rationalizability are both strict renements of sequential rationalizability.
11Indeed, it can be shown that every agenda rationalizable choice function is rationalizable by
game trees. We can provide details upon request.12
This suggests that sequential rationalizability may be of interest in a wider range of
environments that perhaps initially expected.
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